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for or authorized the strike or that the key men were absent 
because some of the claimants participated in the picketing. 
I would, therefore, affirm the judgment. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied September 
25, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
[S. F. No. 18590. In Bank. Aug. 28, 1952.] 
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, 
v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and 
GLENN W. DAHLER, a Minor, Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Relation to 
Employment.-In determining whether a particular act is 
reasonably contemplated by the employment so that injuries 
received while performing it may be compensable, the nature 
of the employment, the custom and usage of a particular 
employment, the terms of the contract of employment, and 
other factors should be considered, and any reasonable doubt 
as to whether the act is contemplated by the employment, in 
view of the policy of liberal construction in favor of the 
employee, should be resolved in his favor. 
[2a, 2b] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-A 
college student employed by operator of store and restaurant 
at a summer resort as a dishwasher and a helper is not en-
titled to compensation for injuries sustained while diving and 
swimming for his own pleasure in a stream off his employer's 
property, although on the resort premises, since in the ab-
sence of evidence that, at the time of such student's hiring, 
anything was said about his participation in any available 
recreational activities or even mention made of the stream, 
it cannot be said that the injuries were sustained in the 
course of or incidental to his employment, or that they were 
proximately caused by the employment. 
[3] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to Employment.-To en-
title an injured employee to compensation there must be some 
connection between the injury and the employment other 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation,§ 61; Am.Jur., Work-
men's Compensation, § 83. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 72; 
[2] Workmen's Compensation, §§ 73, 74; [3] Workmen's Com-
pensation, § 71; [4] Workmen's Compensation, § 73. 
Aug.l952] LIBERTY MuT. INs. Co. v. IND. Ace. CoM. 513 
[39 C.2d 512; 247 P.2d 697] 
than the mere fact that the employment brought him to the 
place of injury. 
[4] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Relation to :Employment.-Mere 
fact that employee had permissive use of recreational area 
beyond employer's premises does not give rise to blanket 
protection under the compensation law, and his swimming 
activities in a stream in that area pursued as an off-duty 
personal diversion in his free time, being unrelated to the 
employment, do not come within the compass of such law. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission awarding compensation for personal in-
juries. Award annulled. 
Leonard, Hanna & Brophy and Edmund D. Leonard for 
Petitioner. 
Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., T. Groezinger, Robert Ball, Leon-
ard Levy and Stanley P. Mamalakis for Respondents. 
SPENCE, J.-Petitioner seeks to annul an award of the 
Industrial Accident Commission in favor of the injured 
employee Glenn W. Dahler. It maintains that the injuries 
did not arise out of, nor were they incurred in the course 
of, the employment, and that therefore they are not com-
pensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. (Lab. 
Code, § 3600, subds. (b), (c).) 
There is no dispute as to the facts. The North Fork 
Association, a sportsmen's club, owned a large recreational 
area in the Sierra. In a portion of this area, it maintained 
a summer resort, "The Cedars," for the exclusive use of 
its members, their families and guests. Located in the re-
sort area were some 25 cabins owned by the members, as 
well as a store and restaurant operated as a concession by 
Swafford and Company, the employer here involved. 
Dahler, a college student, was hired by Mr. Swafford to 
work at the concession during the summer as a dishwasher 
and helper. As his duties were discussed at that time, he 
would be required to serve breakfast and dinner and to 
open and operate the store a couple of hours in the morning. 
He was to receive $35 per week, plus room and board. He 
began his work at the resort on June 27, 1950. He had no 
definite hours of employment but followed a daily routine 
established by Swafford when the latter was on the premises 
39 C.2d-17 
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for a few days to arrange for the concession's opening for 
business on .July L Upon this basis Dahler started work 
at 7 :30 a. m. cleaning the trays for breakfast, which was 
served at 8 a. m. ; then he washed dishes until about 10 
a. m.; and from 10 or 10 :30 a. m. until noon he worked in 
the store filling orders. He usually ate lunch between 12 
and 1 p. m., and then he would return to the work of wash-
ing dishes and cleaning the dining room, finishing these 
chores between 2 and 3 p. m. Normally he would have no 
further work to perform until 5 p. m., when he would begin 
drying trays and serving salads for the evening meal, wash 
the dinner dishes and then clean the dining room, complet-
ing this work about 10 :30 p. Iil. Once each week in the 
afternoon when a truck would come with groceries, he would 
unload the supplies and stock them in the store after he 
finished his dining-room work in the afternoon. Occasionally 
in the afternoons he would deliver goods from the store to 
the cabins of club members. He also had the duty of deliver-
ing telephone messages to the members at their cabins. There 
were only three employees regularly stationed at the resort 
in connection with the operation of the concession: Dahler, 
the cook Robinson, and the cook's wife. Robinson was in 
charge and supervised Dahler's work, but the latter's routine 
followed the pattern fixed by Swafford. 
On the association's property but not on the portion oc-
cupied by the concession was a stream with a dam built 
across it. The pool, which was created by the dam and was 
used for swimming, was some 10 blocks distant from the 
restaurant and some 7 or 8 blocks beyond the cabins. Dahler 
had not been told that he could or could not go swimming 
in the stream but it was just ''more or less taken for granted'' 
that he could. He had swum there on several occasions, the 
first time being on July 3, when he told Swafford that he 
was going swimming in the afternoon during his free hours 
and Swafford did not object. When he had free time, Dahler 
could also have gone fishing or hiking, which were other 
recreational activities available in the area. Dahler had 
been furnished a cottage immediately adjacent to the store, 
which cottage was fitted with all the necessary sanitary facil-
ities so that his swimming in the stream was not necessary 
for cleansing purposes. 
The injuries in question occurred on July 19. On that 
day Dahler finished his early afternoon work about 3 o'clock. 
He then went to the dam to swim, as a matter of personal 
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pleasure during his free time. He swam, sun-bathed, and 
undertook to show a girl how to swim. He then proceeded 
to dive into the stream from some rocks some 3 feet above 
the water level, when he struck a mudbank beneath the 
surface and suffered a severe injury. 
On this evidence the commission found that Dahler ''sus-
tained injury arising md of and in the course of the ernploy-
rnent ... while divirng into a pool on the employer's prem-
ises," and made its award accordingly. (Emphasis added.) 
Respondents concede that the place of injury, the swimming-
pool, was not on the employer's premises and therefore that 
portion of the finding is erroneous. However, there still re-
mains the question of whether Dahler's injury is compens-
able as arising out of and in the course of the employment. 
[l] Our Workmen's Compensation Act has been broadly 
construed to embrace various activities which can, in a rea-
sonable sense, be included within its coverage as incident 
to the employment. So it was said in Employer's Liability 
Assurance Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 37 Cal.App.2d 567, 
at pages 573-574 [99 P.2d 1089]: "If the particular act is 
reasonably contemplatrd by the employment, injuries re-
ceived while performing it arise out of the employment, 
and are compensablr. In determining whether a particular 
act is reasonably contemplated by the employment the nature 
of the act, the nature of the employment, the custom and 
usage of a particular employment, the terms of the contract 
of employment, and perhaps other factors should be con-
sidered. \Any reasonable doubt as to whether the act is 
contemplated by the employment, in view of this state's 
policy of liberal construction in favor of the employee, should 
be resolved in favor of the employee." (Also Pa.cific In-
demnity Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 26 Cal.2d 509, 514 [159 
P.2d 625] ; Bethlehem Steel Co. v. lndust1·1al Ace. Com., 70 
Cal.App.2d 382, 387-388 [161 P.2d 59].) But in adhering 
to the policy of _liberal construction of the act;~~itnevertlie­
less_d.oesl1ot appear possible to stretch its broad purpose 
to cover a case such as this. 
'[2aT~"Tlie·l;ec6rd inclfsputablyestablishes that Dahler was 
injured while diving and swimming solely for his own pleasure 
in a stream off his employer's premises and on his free time 
during a work interlude in midafternoon. It is true that 
the employment may be said to have contemplated that 
Dahler would engage in some recreational activity during 
his free time if he so chose-whether it be swimming, sun-
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bathing, fishing, hiking or any other recreational pursuit 
available in the general area. But that consideration alone 
would not constitute every recreational activity chosen by 
Dahler a part of his compensation under his contract of 
employment nor make the injury compensable as arising out 
of and in the course of the employment. There is no evi-
dence that at the time of hiring Dahler, anything was said 
about his participation in any available recreational activ-
ities nor even mention made of the stream; or that Dahler 
after starting his employment, ever discussed with either 
Swafford or Robinson, the cook, whether he could or could 
not swim in the stream. It does appear that when Dahler 
told Swafford and Robinson on different occasions of free 
time that he was going to swim in the pool, neither offered 
any objection. But neither was in a position to object, for 
the pool was located several blocks beyond the cabin and 
concession area of the resort where Dahler worked and on 
property over which Swafford had no control. 
[3] ''There must be some connection between the injury 
and the employment other than the mere fact that the em-
ployment brought the injured party to the place of injury." 
(Califm·nia Casualty Indem. Exchange v. Industrial Ace. 
Com., 190 Cal. 433, 436 [213 P. 257] .) [4] The mere fact 
that Dahler as Swafford's employee had permissive use of 
the recreational area beyond the employer's premises does 
not give rise to blanket protection under the compensation 
law. Rather, Dahler's swimming activities, unrelated to the 
employment, remote from his place of work and its risk, pur-
sued as an off -duty personal diversion in the employee's free 
time, in an area beyond the dominion and control of his 
employer, and yielding neither advantage nor benefit to the 
employer, must be held to have been wholly without the 
compass of the compensation law. (Arabian American Oil 
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 94 Cal.App.2d 388, 392-393 [210 
P.2d 732].) 
Clearly distinguishable are the cases cited by respondents 
to the effect that employees sustaining injury while engaged 
in the performance of personal acts reasonably and neces-
sarily contemplated by the employment come within the 
protection of the compensation law. For example of these 
cases, see Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 26 
Cal.2d 509 [159 P.2d 625], where two employees were drowned 
in a reservoir on the employer's premises incident to its use 
as a washing facility furnished by the employer for cleansing 
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purposes after the day's farm labor; and Employers' L'ia-
b,ility Assurance Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, 37 
CaLt\pp.2d 567 [99 P.2d 1089], where the employee, a house-
hold servant, was required to live on the employer's premises, 
received her board and room as part of her compensation, and 
was on call by her employer at the time of her injury, which 
resulted from a fall from a stool on which she was standing 
in her own room to see better in the mirror the hem of her 
dress which she was attempting to check. 
It is true, of course, that there are other instances where 
the employee's recreational activity has been held to be so 
related to the employment that a resulting injury was deemed 
to be one arising out of and in the course of the employ-
ment. Such are the cases cited by respondents: E.g. P~usin­
ski v. Transit Valley Country Club, 283 N.Y. 674 [28 N.E. 
2d 401], where the claimant was injured on the employer's 
property, a golf course on which he worked as a caddy, and 
it appeared that the game in which he was hurt was a recrea-
tional activity supervised by the caddy master as a repre-
sentative of the employer and encouraged as practice play 
for the caddies because it "tended to make them more effi-
cient caddies"; and Dowen v. Saratoga Springs Com. (1944), 
267 App.Div. 928 [ 46 N.Y.S.2d 822], where the claimant, a 
locker boy, who was given permission to use a swimming pool 
maintained by his employer in connection with its business and 
upon the premises where he worked, was hurt during his 
recreational hour as the result of a fall from a ladder lead-
ing to a diving-board from which he intended to dive into 
the pool, and the injury was held compensable upon citation 
of the Piusinski case. In such circumstances where the em-
ployee was injured on the employer's premises, where he 
was making permissive use, as contemplated by the contract 
of employment, of the premises and equipment of the em-
ployer used in the conduct of its business, and where the 
recreational activity was conceivably of some benefit to the 
employer, the compensation award was sustained as inci-
dental to the employment. 
[2b] In the present case, the only inference which can 
reasonably be drawn from the evidence is that Dahler's in-
jury occurred while he was engaged in a personal recreational 
activity on his own free time in an area without the orbit 
of his employment and beyond the control or dominion of 
his employer. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said 
that the injury was sustained in the course of or incidental 
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to his employment, or that it was proximately caused by the 
employment. (Arab1:an American 01:z Co. v. Indttstrial Ace. 
Com., supra, 94 Cal.App.2d 388, 393 [210 P.2d 732].) Re-
spondents' theory of compensation rests on the imposition 
of liability arising solely from the mere existence of the 
employment relationship and permits of no logical limitation, 
for carried to its conclusion, it would include any injury 
as a compensable claim if it occurred in pursuance of any 
recreational activity available in the general area regardless 
of connection with the employment. That view of the law 
wouid do violence to the express provisions of the Work-
men's Compensation Act, which require that all compensable 
injuries arise out of and in the course of the employment. 
(Torrey v. Inclttskial Ace. Com., 132 Cal.App. 303, 306 [22 
P.2d 525]; Pacific Inclem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 27 
Cal.App.2d 499, 502-503 [81 P.2d 572] ; Arabian American 
Oil Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., supra, 94 Cal.App.2d 388, 
392-394 [210 P.2d 732] .) 
The award is annulled. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
The opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Bray of the District 
Court of Appeal and concurred in by Mr. Presiding Justice 
Peters and Mr. Justice Fred B. Wood of that court, ably 
sets forth the facts and applicable law. I adopt it as my 
dissent: 
''Petition to review an award of the Industrial Accident 
Commission. The sole issue is whether the injury arose out 
of and was incurred in the course of employment. 
FACTS 
''There is practically no conflict in the evidence. 'l'he 
North Fork Association, comprised of persons enjoying the 
great out-of-doors, owns a large area in the Sierra. Approxi-
mately 25 cabins are owned by the members and are located 
in a portion of the area having a radius equal to about five 
city blocks. This area is called 'The Cedars.' In it is located 
a store and restaurant operated as a concession by Swafford 
and Company. Glenn W. Dahler, a student at the Uni-
versity of California, was 19 years of age. About June 19, 
1950, he was employed by Mr. Swafford for Swafford and 
Company in San Francisco as a dishwasher and helper. 
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About all that was said about his duties at that time was 
that he was to serve breakfast and dinner and open and 
operate the store a couple of hours in the morning. He was 
to receive $35 per week plus room and board. His employ-
ment started on the 26th when he went in Swafford's truck 
with the Swafford and Company cook and her husband to 
The Cedars. They arrived late that night. On the morning 
of the 27th, he helped clean the grill (the restaurant) and 
apparently worked around it until July 1st when it opened 
for business. It was patronized exclusively by the mem-
bers of the North Fork Association, their guests and the 
employees of the members. Mr. Swafford was present the 
first two or three days the grill opened. Glenn's duties 
started about 8 a. m. when he helped serve breakfast, except 
on days when the trays were dirty, when he started at 7 :30 
and cleaned the trays. After breakfast he washed dishes. 
About 10 or 10 :30 he opened the store and filled orders until 
12. If patrons wanted meat he would thaw it out and de-
liver it in the afternoon. He usually ate lunch between 
12 and 1 with the employees of the association. He would 
then go back to the dishes, clean the dining room and sweep 
the floor, finishing between 2 and 3. About once a week 
the truck would come with groceries and he would unload 
and pack them away after he finished the dining room. If 
meat had been ordered, he would deliver it at this time also. 
He would then be free until around 5 when he would get 
the trays dried and ready for dinner, serve salads, bus dishes 
and wash them. This would take until about 10 :30. Swafford 
had g·iven him no definite hours to work. Swafford, how-
ever, observed the work that Glenn did. The cook's husband, 
Robinson, was in charge and supervised some of Glenn's 
duties but Swafford established Glenn's routine. When tele-
phone calls came for members, Glenn would go to their 
cabins and notify them to go to the telephone in the amuse-
ment hall adjoining the grill. 
"On the association property, but not on the portion oc-
cupied by the employer's concession, a distance of about 
ten blocks from the grill, was a dam where the members, 
their guests and their employees and employees of the as-
sociation swam. Glenn had swum thrre before, the first 
time being July 3d. No one had told him he could go swim-
ming there, or that he could not; it was just more or less 
taken for granted tJ1at he could. On one occasion when 
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Swafford decided not to take inventory, Glenn told him he 
would go swimming instead. Swafford did not object. Dur-
ing his work at The Cedars, Glenn left camp only three 
times at the most. One night he went with Swafford to 
Reno to see the sights, and twice he left camp to get gro-
ceries. When he did not have time to go swimming he stayed 
around the camp. When he had free time he could have 
gone fishing or hiking. On July 19th, Glenn got through 
with washing the lunch dishes and getting the dining room 
in order for dinner around 3 o'clock. He then went to the 
dam to swim, and for no other purpose. He swam, sun-
bathed, and attempted to show a girl who was a daughter 
of a member how to swim. He then dove off around two 
and a half to three feet from the steep rocks into the water, 
which at that spot was about four feet deep. A girl was 
standing about where he dove as he had asked her to do so 
as to show the depth. He struck a mudbank or something. 
He could not move his body and he was pulled out by the 
girl. He received severe damage to his spinal cord. 
''On this evidence the referee made a finding that Dahler 
'sustained injury arising out of and in the co1tr'se of the 
empToyment ... whiTe diving into a pooT on the employer's 
premises.' (Italics added.) 
wAS SWIMMING AT THE DAM CONTEMPLATED 
IN THE EMPLOYMENT? 
"Respondents concede that the place of injury, the pool, 
was not on the employer's premises and hence that portion 
of the finding is erroneous. This, however, does not end 
the case. The question left to be determined is whether 
swimming at the dam was reasonably contemplated in the 
employment of Glenn, and therefore the injury arose out 
of and in the course of that employment. It is appar-
ent from the record that at the time Glenn was hired 
by Swafford very little was said about his duties, and 
that what he was to do was determined in large part 
by what he was told to do by Swafford and Robinson at 
the camp, and what all took for granted he did without his 
being expressly directed. He· was confined rather closely 
to camp and his leisure time was quite restricted. A reason-
able inference from all the facts and circumstances is that 
it was contemplated as a part of his employment that he 
was to receive, besides his pay, room and board, the right 
to swim at the dam. This was the recreation he was ex-
pected to take as the time element did not permit him any 
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form which would take him away from camp. While 'camp' 
was generally considered to be the area occupied by the 
homes of the members, a reasonable inference from the evi-
dence is that it also included the dam where everyone at 
The Cedars went to swim. 
''The inferences above mentioned are not compelled by 
the circumstances nor are they the only ones that could 
be drawn therefrom. However, they are reasonable ones 
and under the well known rule, where different inferences 
may reasonably be drawn from the facts, we are bound by 
the determination thereof by the commission. 
AUTHORITIES 
"The parties have not cited, nor have we found, any case 
where the facts were identical with those in the case at bar. 
The nearest case factually is Dowan v. Saratoga Springs Com. 
(1944), 267 App.Div. 928 [46 N.Y.S.2d 822]. There, locker 
boys, during their lunch hour and after working hours, when 
accommodation::; were not crowded, were given permission to 
use the swimming pool maintained by the employer in con-
nection with its business and upon the premises where the 
boys were employed. One of the boys, during his recrea-
tion hour, was climbing a ladder leading to a diving board 
from which he intended to dive into the pool. He slipped 
and was injured. 'rhe State Industrial Board ruled that 
he was entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Law. The court affirmed the award. There, of 
course, the injury occurred on the employer's premises. In 
our case it was off his premises. This distinction, however, 
is not important. If the recreation facilities are provided 
as a part of the employment, it could make no difference 
whether they were on or off the employer's premises or were 
or were not owned by the employer. 
''A case illustrating the principle applied by the commis-
sion, although the facts are stronger than in our case, is 
Piusinski v. Transit Valley Country Chtb, 283 N.Y. 674 
[28 N.E.2d 401]. There the claimant was employed by the 
club as a golf caddy. He and the other caddies were en-
couraged to play golf on the club's course each Monday 
under the supervision of a caddy master, not only for their 
own amusement, but because the practice tended to make them 
more efficient caddies. Claimant was injured while engaged 
in such a practice game with the other caddies. The court 
supported the finding of the commission that the injury 
arose out of and in the course of the employment. 
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''While the facts are somewhat different, it is difficult to 
distinguish the ruling in Employers' etc. Corp. v. Industrial 
Ace. Com., 37 CaLApp.2d 567 [99 P.2d 1089], from that of 
the commission here. There the, employee, hired as a cook, 
was required to live at her employer's residence, and, as part 
of her compensation, received her room and board. On 
what was normally her 'day off,' the maid had left, so she 
worked until 11 or 11 :30 a. m. She then told her employer 
that she would return early that evening to wash the dishes. 
A little before 8 p. m. she returned. She put an apron 
over her street dress and washed the dishes. She then re-
tired to her room. She was then on call to answer the tele-
phone or the doorbell, and was expecting her employer to 
call her to take care of the child. While waiting, she noticed 
that her dress was a little long. The mirror was hot adjust-
able. To observe more clearly the hem of the dress she 
stood on a stool. While shortening the dress, she slipped 
and fell, sustaining injuries which the commission found 
occurred in the course of and arose out of her employment. 
After pointing out that where an employee is required to 
live on the employer's premises, any injury received while 
the employee is making a reasonable ·use of said premises 
is in the course of the employment, even though received 
during the employee's leisure time, the court states that 
the only debatable question is whether the injury could be 
said to have arisen out of the employment. It then stated 
(p. 570) : "fhe mere fact that the employee was engaged 
in performing a personal act when injured does not, per se, 
determine that the injury did not arise out of the employ-
ment.' It refers to a number of cases in which the employee 
was engaged in performing a personal act when injured, 
and such act was held to arise out of the employment, such 
as Western Pac. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 193 Cal. 
413 [224 P. 754], where a messenger was struck by an auto-
mobile while returning to his place of employment from his 
home where he had gone to get his overcoat; Whiting-Mead 
Commercial Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 178 Cal. 505 [173 
P. 1105, 5 A.L.R. 1518], where an employee had injured 
his hand while working for his employer and later, while 
lighting a cigarette, set fire to the bandage which had been 
soaked in turpentine; Martin v. Lovibond & Sons, 7 B.W.C.C. 
243, where a drayman was required to work from 8 a. m. 
to 9 p. m.; during that time he took no meals at home; he 
left his team at the side of the street and crossed over to 
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refresh himself at a pub with a glass of beer; he was there 
about two minutes and on returning across the street was 
killed by an automobile; Thomas v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. 
Co., 104 Kan. 432 [179 P. 372, 6 A.L.IL 1145), where an 
employee was injured while at play during the noon hour. 
The court refers to Campbell's Workmen's Compensation, 
vol. 1, pp. 199-202, for a long list of situations where the 
employee was allowed compensation whlle performing purely 
personal acts. It refers to the cases from other states col-
lected by Campbell which show a contrary rule but points 
out that they are in states which have a doctrine of strict 
construction of compensation acts, and that such doctrine 
has never been adopted in this state. It then holds that 
the theory of the cases which it approved, as well as the 
one upon which it decided the case, is that the employee, 
when injured, was engag·ed in doing something he might 
reasonably have been expected to do while in the perform-
ance of his duty, or something which was reasonably con-
templated by his employment. 'If the particular act is rea-
sonably contemplated by the employment, injuries received 
while performing it arise out of the employment, and are 
compensable. In determining whether a particular act is 
reasonably contemplated by the employment the nature of 
the act, the nature of the employment, the custom and usage 
of a particular emp]oyment, the terms of the contract of 
employment, and perhaps other factors should be considered. 
Any reasonable doubt as to whether the act is contemplated 
by the employment, in view of this state's policy of liberal 
construction in favor of the employee, should be resolved in 
favor of the employee.' (Pp. 573, 574.) 
"In Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 26 Cal.2d 
509 [159 P.2d 625], t-wo boys, 'rhomas and Adolfo, with 
other members of their family, we:r;e employed as grape pick-
ers on a piecework basis. After working all morning one 
Saturday they quit at noon, as did all the other pickers. Ac-
companied by their sister and two friends, fellow workers, 
they ·went by automobile to their home, some few miles dis-
tant from the camp supplied by the employer to most of 
his employees, to pick up their work cards, which showed 
their earnings for the week. They had been told that they 
would get their pay at the office after 1 p. m. About 12:40 
they stopped at an irrigation reservoir located on the em-
ployer's property to wash their hands, faces and feet, as 
they were 'dirty.' They then intended to go to the office 
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for their pay. Adolfo and one of the other boys had finished 
their ablutions and were standing by the automobile, when 
Thomas, then in the reservoir and unable to swim, called for 
help. Adolfo and the other boy plunged into the reservoir 
to rescue Thomas. They were unsuccessful. The other boy, 
with the aid of a woman, managed to pull himself out, but 
both Thomas and Adolfo were drowned. The reservoir was 
used regularly for washing after work by all the grape pickers, 
and many of them went swimming there. The commission 
found that the deaths arose out of and occurred in the course 
of their employment. The court upheld the finding of the 
commission. The following excerpts from the opinion in that 
case apply to our case : 'In considering the problem of the 
compensable nature of the deaths in question, it must be 
remembered that the reviewing court is not to determine 
the weight to be given the evidence [citations] or which of 
two opposing inferences should be drawn therefrom. [ Cita-
tions.] A review of the record in the light of these prin-
ciples of law sustains the commission's findings and awards.' 
(Pp. 512, 513.) 'Whether a given accident is so related 
or incident to the work in which the employee is engaged 
depends upon its own particular circumstances. No exact 
formula can be laid down which will automatically solve 
every case. [Citations.] The question is, of course, pri-
marily one for the commission to determine.' (P. 516.) The 
contention was made that there was no causal connection 
between the employment and the death of Adolfo. He had 
finished his ablutions and was standing by the automobile 
when he heard his brother and coemployee Thomas cry for 
help. Adolfo was drowned in the attempted rescue. The 
court held that the death was of an industrial nature and 
compensable. A somewhat similar situation occurred in 
O'Leavy v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 [71 S.Ct. 
470, 95 L.Ed. 483], although in the latter case the death 
occurred off the employer's premises. The employer was a 
government contractor operating on the island of Guam. It 
maintained for its employees a recreation center near the 
shoreline, along which ran a channel so dangerous for swim-
mers that its use was forbidden, and signs to that effect 
erected. John Valak, the employee, spent the afternoon at 
the center and was waiting for his employer's bus to take 
him from the area, when he heard two men, standing on the 
reefs beyond the channel; signaling for help. Fo1lowed by 
nearly twenty he plunged in to effect a rescue, In 
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attempting to swim the channel to reach the two men he 
was drowned. On a claim filed by his dependent mother 
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensa-
tion Act (33 U.S.C. § 90l.et seq., 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq.) 
the commissioner found as a 'fact' that the death arose out 
of and in the course of the employment. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit reversed this finding, on the 
ground that the lethal currents were not a part of the facil-
ities supplied by the employer and that the attempted rescue 
was neither for recreation nor was it in the course of the 
employment. The Supreme Court, with a dissent by three 
justices, reversed the decision of that court, and held that, 
while the facts did not compel, they supported an infer-
ence that the death was fairly attributable to the risks of 
the employment. It pointed out that an application of the 
act which 'precluded an award for injuries incurred in an 
attempt to rescue persons not known to be in the employer's 
service, undertaken in forbidden waters outside the employ-
er's premises ... is too restricted an interpretation of the 
Act. Workmen's compensation is not confined by common 
law conceptions of scope of employment.' (P. 471 [71 S. 
Ct.].) 'The test of recovery is not a causal relation between 
the nature of employment of the injured person and the 
accident. Thom v. Sinclair, (Eng.) [1917] A.C. 127, 142 
[Ann. Cas. 1917D 188]. Nor is it necessary that the em-
ployee be engaged at the time of the injury in activity of 
benefit to his employer. All that is required is that the 
"obligations or conditions" of employment create the "zone· 
of special danger" out of which the injury arose.' (Pp. 471, 
472 [71 S.Ct.].) Applying to the facts of our case the 
test as set forth in Em1ployers' etc. Corp. v. Industrial Ace. 
CoYn., supm, 37 Cal.App.2d 567, and in the cases above 
mentioned, raises an inference that the employment of this 
young college stud10nt contemplated that in addition to his 
pay, board and room, he was to use as an incident of that 
employment the swimming facilities provided by the asso-
ciation for its employees, and which Swafford's employees 
had the right to use. Actually, Glenn's right to use the pool 
was by resaon of his distinct status as an employee and as 
an incident of his employment. (See Pacific Indem. Co. v. 
Ind1~strial Ace. Corn., supra, 26 Cal.2d 509, 515.) 
"Petitioner contends that the fact that the place of injury 
was off the employer's premises is controlling, quoting from 
Makins v. Industrial Ace. Com., 198 Cal. 698 [247 P. 202, 
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49 A.IJ.R. 411], and that for the same reason the so-called 
'bunkhouse rule' does not apply. However, the place of in-
jury is not the criterion. (See Associated Indem. C01·p. v. 
Industrial Ace. Com., 18 Cal.2d 4Q [112 P.2d 615] .) It is, 
whether the act of the employee when injured is reason-
ably contemplated by the employment. 
''There are a number of jurisdictions where the rule of 
strict interpretation of Workmen's Compensation· Acts pre-
vails, the cases from which support petitioner's contentions. 
But as that rule does not prevail in California, it is unneces-
sary to discuss them. Graf v. Montecito County Water Dist., 
1 Cal.2d 222 [34 P.2d 138], is easily distinguishable on the 
facts from our case. 'l'here, the injured employees 'were 
neither going to nor returning from their work, they lived 
at the campsite and had been to their abodes, changed their 
clothes and boarllerl the train [belonging to the employer] 
for an excursion of pleasure wholly aside from their duties 
as employees' (p. 22f.i). Moreover, the court stated that the 
record failed to show the exact terms of the employment, 
and there was no evidence that transportation was promised 
the employees as a part of their contract, and hence nothing 
in the record. to support the petitioner's contention that rid-
ing on the train was incidental to the employment. More-
over, the case was decirled in 1934. The dissenting opinion 
of Shenk, J., to the effect that the train ride was incidental 
to the employment more nearly represents the Supreme 
Court's attitude today. Nor is Torrey v. Indu.strial Ace. 
Com., 132 Cal.App. 303 [22 P.2c1 525], in point. There, 
the employee went to a picnic ground to discuss business 
with a coemployee. The latter invited him to go for a motor-
boat ride. 'rhe boat turned over and both men were drowned. 
'rhe commission held. that the death did not occur in the 
course of employment. The court upheld this determina-
tion, holding that the business of the employer was either 
concluded, or postponed at the time of the boat ride and 
that the evidence failed to show that the employee went on 
the boat ride for any pnrpose other than his personal pleasure. 
The court refers to the fact that adverse as well as favor-
able inferences may be drawn from the petitioner's evidence. 
It may well have been that had the commission drawn an 
inference to the effect that business was to be discussed dur-
ing the five-minute boat ride, the court would have upheld 
such action of the commission. In that case, differing from 
ours, there was no finding that the interlude of pleasure 
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was an incident of the employment. This same factor is 
the distinction between our case and Langendorf United 
Bakeries, Inc. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 6 Cal.App.2d 46 [43 
P.2d 1106], Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 27 
Cal.App.2d 499 [81 P.2d 752], Red Arrow etc. Corp. v. In-
dustrial Ace. Com., 39 Cal.App.2d 559 [103 P.2d 1004], and 
others cited by petitioner. 
"In Roberts v. llieans, 146 Pa.Super. 188 [22 A.2d 98], 
a boy employed at a hotel to carry bags and rent boats on 
the shore of a lake, was drowned while diving from a boat 
which after his day's work and after his supper he had 
rowed out on the lake. The court held that under the evi-
dence he was using the boat solely for his own pleasure. 
While the boy had been given permission by the employer 
to swim from the wharf, if his employer was present, he 
had been forbidden to go out in a boat under penalty of 
losing his job. Obviously there is no similarity with the 
facts in our case. The court also held that the boy's in-
jury occurred off the employer's premises but pointed out 
that this fact would not be conclusive had the appellant 
met the burden of showing that the injury occurred in the 
course of the employment. 
"In State Young Men's C. As.sn. v. Industrial Com., 235 
Wis. 161 [292 N.W. 324], Kregel, a medical student, was 
employed as a counselor to assist the first aid medical direc-
tor of a Y.M.C.A. summer camp. He was subject to call 
on his free time, and hence he was usually within the camp 
area. He was paid a salary and room and board. When 
not actually occupied he was privileged to use the camp 
recreational facilities including the tennis courts. While 
engaged in a game of tennis with other counselors he was 
struck in the eye by a tennis ball, causing the injury for 
which he sought compensation. In reversing the lower court, 
which had confirmed an award of the Wisconsin Industrial 
Commission, the Supreme Court acted on the theory that 
his play was purely voluntary on his part and was in no-
wise for the benefit of his employer. The theory of the 
case is that 'there is no evidence that at the time the injury 
was received the claimant was engaged in any work for his 
employer.' (P. 326 [292 N.W.].) In California the right 
to compensation by an employee is not limited to injuries 
rereived vvhile actually engaging in the employer's work. 
''The facts in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Fulmer, 
81 Ga.App. 97 [57 S.E.2d], cited by petitioner, are so dis-
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similar to those in our case as not to require comment. It, 
Brynwood Land Co. v. Indttstrial Com., 243 Wis. 380 [10 
N.W.2d 137], and Mishawaka, R1tbber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. 
Walker, 119 Ind.App. 309 [84 N.E.2d 897], applied the 
well known rule that an injury sustained by an employee 
while engaging in recreational activity for his own amuse-
ment is not compensable. None of them considers the sit-
uation where, as in our case, the place and type of recrea-
tion is provided by the employer as an incident of the em-
ployment. 
"Petitioner cites Pacific Indem. Co. v. Industrial Ace. 
Com., s1rpra, 27 Cal.App.2d 499, for the proposition that 
'the mere fact of employment and permission to use the 
premises of the employer does not give rise to a right to 
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act ... 
for an injury resulting to an employe.' (P. 503.) There, 
the claimant was injured while attending a union meeting 
in a room on the employer's premises, which the employer 
had expressly agreed with the union committee might be 
used for that purpose. In denying compensation, the court 
points out that not only was the employee not engaging 
in any business for her employer, but for aught that ap-
pears, the meeting may have been held for purposes antag-
onistic to her employer. There can be no quarrel with the 
principle above mentioned. Our case, as herein shown, does 
not depend upon that principle.'' 
''The award is affirmed.'' 
For the reasons above stated, I would affirm the award. 
